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OUTSOURCING DEMOCRACY: REDEFINING PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
GILDA R. DANIELS t 
INTRODUCTION 
"We are left with a system in which almost every state still out-
sources its elections to what are actually private organizations. "I 
In 2008, during a hotly contested presidential campaign, legions of 
private individuals, nonprofit organizations, political parties, and candi-
dates embarked upon canvassing, registering and assisting citizens, and 
monitoring voting problems in a historic presidential election.2 Certainly, 
the 2000 election debacle-in which the world watched as our election 
process seemed to implode with butterfly ballots, hanging chads, and 
disproportionate disenfranchisement in the minority community-
prompted extreme criticism of how the United States handles elections.3 
Since the 2000 election, we have witnessed an increase in private 
participation in elections. The level of private involvement spanned from 
registering voters, to getting citizens to the ballot box through get out the 
vote campaigns ("GOTV"), assisting limited English proficient ("LEP") 
citizens, and monitoring Election Day activities.4 This increased in-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, 1.0.1990, New York 
University School of Law. Thanks to Michele Estrin Gilman, Henry L. Chambers and Darren 
Hutchinson for their helpful comments; a special note of gratitude to my Research Assistants, Anne 
Wilkinson and Latoya Francis-Williams, for their incredible work. This Article was supported by a 
summer research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
I. Phil Keisling, To Reduce Partisanship, Get Rid of Partisans, N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 
2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ2010/03/22/0pinionl22keisling.html?J=1 (for-
mer Oregon Secretary of State arguing for the elimination of primaries and stating that "[ w lith the 
approval of the Supreme Court, the parties have the authority to exclude independent voters or other 
non-members who might seriously challenge their partisan shibboleths or taboos"). 
2. During the 2008 election, nonpartisan organizations chronicled numerous voting irregu-
larities in voter registration, felon disenfranchisement, long lines at the polls, poll watcher chal-
lenges, and unwarranted challenges to student voters and deceptive practices. See, e.g., Hearing on 
Lessons Learnedfrom the 2008 Election Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, III th Congo I (2009) (statement of Tova Andrea 
Wang, Vice President, Research, Common Cause); Id. (statement of Hillary O. Shelton, Washington 
Bureau Chief, NAACP); see also Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight of the Department of 
Justice's Preparations for the 2008 General Election: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, I 10th Cong. I (2008) (statement of Gilda R. Daniels, Assistant Professor, University of Balti-
more School of Law). 
3. See, e.g., Bush V. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 
531 U.S. 70 (2000); Gore V. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000); Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush 
V. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.1. 1035 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush V. 
Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. I (2007). 
4. For example, nonpartisan organizations, such as Election Protection, self-described as 
"the nation's largest non-partisan voter protection coalition," used more than 10,000 volunteers and 
received over 200,000 calls to its hotline during the election season and more than 80,000 calls on 
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volvement has been criticized on many fronts; critiques range from the 
involvement of the media5 to voting machine manufacture6 to voter reg-
istration.? In some instances, government has outsourced its obligations 
to private entities. 8 
Private partisan involvement in elections has hit troubling levels-
from partisan election administrators at the highest rank to federal gov-
ernment officials tasked with enforcing and protecting voting rights 
laws.9 The government has outsourced its authority to private groups, 
particularly private partisans, who use public authority for private politi-
cal gain. Governments outsource in a wide variety of areas, such as edu-
cation, prisons, and the military.lo The increase in private partisan 
Election Day. Election Protection, Election Protection 2008: Helping Voters Today, Modernizing the 
System for Tomorrow: Preliminary Analysis of Voting Irregularities I (2008), available at 
http://www.8660urvote.orgitools/documents/files/0077.pdf; About Us, ELECTION PROTECTION, 
hllp://www.8660urvote.org/about (last visited Oct. 10, 20 I 0). 
5. James Brown & Paul L. Hain, Private Administration of a Public Function: The News 
Election Service, 2 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 389,389 (1980) ("In the case of election administration, 
however, the public officials have abdicated responsibility for election night aggregation of the 
national Vote totals to a private organization, News Election Service, which is owned by five major 
news organizations. This private organization performs without a contract, without public compensa-
tion, and without supervision by public officials. It makes decisions concerning its duties according 
to its own criteria. The questions of responsibility and accountability have not arisen in part because 
of the private organization's performance record and in part because the responsibility was assumed 
gradually over a lengthy period without ever being evaluated as an item on the public agenda."). 
6. John C. Bonifaz, Our Voting Re-Public, in REBOOTING AMERICA: IDEAS FOR 
REDESIGNING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY FOR THE INTERNET AGE 133, 134 (Allison Fine, Micah L. 
Sifry, Andrew Rasiej & Josh Levy, eds., 2008), available at http://rebooting.personaldemocracy.com 
Ifiles/JohnBonifaz.pdf ("[AJ small handful of private companies (including, but not limited to, The 
Election Systems & Software Company, Diebold Election Systems, now known as Premier Election 
Solutions, and Sequoia Voting Systems) have gained enormous profit and influence marketing their 
electronic voting systems to states and municipalities as the answer to the 'hanging chad' fiasco in 
Florida."). 
7. In recent years, state governments have placed limits on private entities, particularly in the 
area of third party voter registration and assistance at the polls. A 2008 Brennan Center report noted 
that: 
Americans have run voter registration drives to register their fellow citizens to vote for 
decades, but until very recently often had to be deputized by the state to do so. This 
"deputy registrar" system left drives at the mercy of county or state officials who could 
deny that deputization to disfavored groups, or restrict the number of people who could 
take part. 
Restrictions on Community-Based Voter Registration Drives, Brennan Center for Justice I (Aug. 4, 
2008), http://brennan.3cdn.netlca85dbct2d2ae045ff_awm6iviui.pdf. For suggestions on modernizing 
the voter registration process, see, e.g., Wendy Weiser, Michael Waldman & Renee Paradis, Voter 
Registration Modernization: Policy Summary, in VOTER REGISTRATION MODERNIZATION: 
COLLECTED BRENNAN CENTER REPORTS AND PAPERS 9, 9-15 (Wendy Weiser ed., 2008), available 
at http://brennan.3cdn.netl329ceaa2878946baI7_kwm6btu6r.pdf. 
8. See Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 
HARV. L REV. 1248, 1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Public/Private Distinction]; see also Jody Free-
man, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,547 (2000). 
9. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institu-
tions, 28 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 125 (2009) (suggesting ways to address partisan election adminis-
trators in the next wave of election reform); Pamela S. Karlan, Lessons Learned: Voting Rights and 
the Bush Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'y 17 (2009) (arguing that the Bush 
administration's Department of Justice Civil Rights Division displayed partisan objectives in the 
enforcement of voting rights). 
10. See infra Part L 
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groups' participation in unique government roles follows the recent trend 
toward outsourcing and privatization in all aspects of government opera-
tions. 11 While private involvement often garners support for government 
ideals, such as promoting and encouraging voter participation, the use of 
private partisan voter challenges have different objectives: promoting 
one's candidate,12 voter suppression,13 or the less sinister but just as ef-
fective voter frustration and confusion. 14 
Private partisan activity, primarily voter cagingl5 and voter chal-
lenges,16 tends to undermine the very right it was designed to protect-
namely, free and equal voter participation. 17 Since the states determine 
II. See Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1248,1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Public/Private Distinction]; see also Jody Free-
man, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.V. L. REV. 543,547 (2000). 
12. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("The poll-watcher performs 
a dual function on Election Day. On the one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political 
party, his job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other hand, because exercise 
of his authority promotes an honest election, the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of 
the vote. Protecting the purity of the electoral process is a state responsibility and the poll-watcher's 
statutory role in providing that protection involves him in a public activity, regardless of his private 
political motive."). 
13. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578-79 
(D. N.J. 2009). After the 2008 election, the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") and the Re-
publican National Committee ("RNC") sought to modify a consent decree limiting the RNC's "bal-
lot security measures." [d. at 579. The court noted that, "The RNC produced thousands of pages of 
newspaper articles and other sources documenting alleged incidents of voter fraud over the past 27 
years, while the DNC did the same with respect to voter intimidation." [d. at 578. 
14. See, e.g., WENDY WEISER & VISHAL AGRAHARKAR, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 
BALLOT SECURITY AND VOTER SUPPRESSION: INFORMATION CITIZENS SHOULD KNOW I (2010), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.netle2d20eec819018aa49_xpm6iixxd.pdf. 
I S. See Chandler Davidson et a\., Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique, 34 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2008) ("[V]ote caging is defined as a three-stage process 
designed to identify persons in another political party or faction whose names are on a voter registra-
tion list, but whose legal qualification to vote is dubious, and then to challenge their qualification 
either before or on Election Day. Ostensibly, caging is an attempt to prevent voter fraud. In practice, 
it may have the effect of disenfranchising voters .... "). There are a few theories on the origin of the 
term, one being that caging lists seem to have originated in the direct-mail fund-raising business. 
Because the term is so new, a formal definition cannot be found in a traditional print dictionary but 
can be found on websites such as Wikipedia or the Double-Tongued Dictionary. Id. at 537. How-
ever, according to Wikipedia, fundraisers will hire third-parties to handle the processing of responses 
to direct mail, which may include "processing payments, compiling product orders, correcting re-
cipient addresses, processing returned mail, providing lockbox services and depositing funds re-
ceived into the hiring organization's bank account, and all of the associated data entry for each of 
these services." Caging (Direct Mail), WIKIPEDlA, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilCaging 
_(direct_mail) (last modified July 17,2010). The term "caging" itself may be a derivative of the 
financial teller cage, since a number of operations related to lockbox services involve the control and 
protection of funds. Another explanation involves the "old postal 'cages,' the hundreds of cubby 
holes that fronted postal desks for sorting." Ed Brayton, GOP Has a History of Voter 'Caging,' 
According to Democrats' Lawsuit, THE MICH. MESSENGER (Sept. 17, 2008, 8:10 PM), 
http://michiganmessenger.coml4479/gop-has-a-history-of-voter-caging-according-to-democrats-
lawsuit. 
16. See infra Parts I-IV. 
17. See Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Mont. 2008) ("Ea-
ton and the Montana Republican Party are abusing the process the State of Montana has provided to 
ensure the accuracy of voter rolls (indeed, they are using the process designed to protect the integrity 
of the political process to undermine it) .... "). 
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the time, places, and manner for elections,18 they also develop the rules 
for allowing voter challenges. No federal law governs voter challenges; 19 
as such, laws explaining who can challenge and what authority they are 
given vary from state to state. Most states call the individuals who con-
duct voter challenges "poll watchers,,,2o "challengers,,,21 and/or "observ-
ers,,22 and allow them to observe the casting of ballots, the counting of 
absentee ballots, and in some instances, challenge the poll workers han-
dling of the process?3 
The often related voter caging or vote caging occurs when a politi-
cal party sends registered mail to addresses of registered voters. 24 If the 
mail is returned as undeliverable-because, for example, the voter re-
fuses to sign for it, the voter isn't present for delivery, or the voter is 
homeless-the party uses that fact to challenge the registration, arguing 
that because the voter could not be reached at the address, the registra-
tion is fraudulent. 25 The private group then prepares a caging list, which 
"is a list or database of addresses, updated after a mailing program is 
completed, with notations on responses received from recipients with 
corrections for addresses that mail has been returned as" undelivered or 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing 
Senators. "). 
19. See Frank Emmert, Chirstopher Page & Antony Page, Trouble Counting Votes? Compar-
ing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Other Selected Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REv. 
3, 30-34 (2007). The authors argue that some of the problems in past U.S. elections occurred be-
cause of lack of uniform and transparent laws guiding elections at the national level and that the 
United States needs to make improvements in its election procedures and laws. [d. 
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312(a)(2) (2009) ("poll watcher" or "representative"); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19362 (West 2003) ("poll watchers"). 
21. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:427 (2004) ("watchers"); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 168.730-.734 (West 2005) ("challenger"); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115. \05-.107 (1997) ("chal-
lenger" and "watcher"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 666:4-:5 (2010) ("challenger"); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:7-5 (West 1999) ("challengers"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-45 (2010) ("observers"); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2010) ("observers"). 
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-604(1) (2010) ("observers"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 29A.04.630 (West 2005) ("political parties" and "elections observers"). 
23. A few states explicitly allow challengers to question an election official's performance. 
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:427 (2004) (allowing a watcher to contest "any infraction of the 
law"); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 168.730 (West 2005) (allowing challengers to question election 
workers and procedures). 
24. See Davidson et aI., supra note 15, at 538. 
25. See Jo Becker, GOP Challenging Voter Registrations: Civil Rights Groups Accuse Repub-
licans of Trying to Disenfranchise Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at AS. Jo Becker, a 
reporter for the Washington Post, stated that in 1981 "the [RNC] sent letters to predominantly" 
African-American neighborhoods in New Jersey. ld. When 45,000 of these letters were returned as 
undelivered, the RNC attempted to challenge the voters whose mail was returned and have his or her 
name removed from voter rolls. [d. In 1986, the RNC attempted to do the same to 31,000 people in 
Louisiana. [d. Similarly in 2004, the RNC challenged voters in Ohio for undeliverablemail. [d. In 
that same year, Republicans also sent mail to 130,000 voters in Philadelphia neighborhoods, whose 
residents are predominantly black and Democratic. [d. In reference to attempted voter purges and 
influencing voter rolls, Republicans said their actions had nothing to do with partisanship and had 
"nothing to do with race." Jd. 
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forwarded. 26 A political party then uses the "caging list" to challenge the 
validity of a voter's registration?? In order for the voter's provisional 
ballot to be counted, the voter may have to defend and prove his or her 
eligibility. 28 
Voter caging and voter challenges have been used to target racial 
minorities and to otherwise disrupt the voting process. The use of abu-
sive voter challenges was evident after the 2008 Presidential election 
when voters in New York suffered suppression of the right to vote?9 
Attorneys present at the polls "documented efforts to suppress minority 
voters.,,30 The attorneys reported: 
Some of the suppressive actions ... included an armed 
man with police shield escorting around alleged poll watchers 
throughout various polling sites during voting hours; repeated 
blanket challenges to minority voters at a particular polling lo-
cation ... and a widespread challenge to nearly 6,000 Democ-
ratic voters who allegedly did not live where their voter regis-
tration information claimed they did. 31 
A New York Times reporter characterized the suppression activities 
as "chaotic.,,32 The New York legislature subsequently introduced legis-
lation to outlaw these practices.33 In another example, while the Republi-
can National Committee (RNC) was defending a lawsuit in Louisiana, it 
26. Caging (Direct Mail), WIKIPEDlA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caging_(direct_mail) (last 
modified July 17,2010). Caging lists seem to have originated in the direct-mail fund-raising busi-
ness. See id. Fundraisers will hire third-parties to handle the processing of responses to direct mail, 
"which may include processing payments, compiling product orders, correcting recipient addresses, 
processing returned mail, providing lockbox services and depositing funds received into the hiring 
organization's bank account, and all of the associated data entry for each of these services." Id. The 
term caging "may be a derivative of the financial teller cage, since a number of operations related to 
lockbox services involve the control and protection of funds." Id. 
27. See Becker, supra note 25. During the 2008 presidential election, the Republican Party in 
Macomb County, Michigan proposed using foreclosure lists to challenge voters at the polls. Eartha 
Jane Melzer, Lose Your House, Lose Your Vote, MICH. MESSENGER (Sept. 10, 2008, 6:42 AM), 
http://michiganmessenger.com/4076I1ose-your-house-Iose-your-vote. The party quickly backtracked 
from its proposed strategy, but even the mere proposition that foreclosures would be used to intimi-
date and potentially disenfranchise voters is reprehensible and problematic. Eartha Jane Melzer, 
Republicans Recant Plans to Foreclose Voters but Admit Other Strategies, MICH. MESSENGER 
(Sept. II, 2008, 3:41 PM), http://michiganmessenger.com/4231/republicans-recant-plans-to-
foreclose-voters-but-admit-other-strategies. 
28. See, e.g., Act of June 20, 2005, ch. 277, § 24, 2005 Fla. Laws 2614, 2643 (allowing a 
voter to provide evidence of eligibility to the county canvassing board and providing that "a provi-
sional ballot shall be counted unless the canvassing board determines by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the person was not entitled to vote"). State laws provide the opportunity for private 
actors to "challenge" a voter's eligibility to participate in the election process. See, e.g., Act of June 
20,2005, ch. 277, § 27, 2005 Fla. Laws 2614, 2646. In order to exert a challenge, most states do not 
require any threshold finding of ineligibility. See, e.g., id. (requiring only a "good faith" belief). 
29. See S. 2554, 232d Ann. Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.open.nysenate.govllegislation/biIVS2554B (giving the justification of the original bill). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. See id. 
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released a memo from one of its party officials indicating its intentions to 
suppress the minority vote.34 The pertinent part of the memo read: "I 
would guess that this program will eliminate at least 60-80,000 folks 
from the rolls .... If it's a close race ... which I'm assuming it is, this 
could keep the black vote down considerably.,,35 
Additionally, in a hotly contested 2003 mayoral election in Phila-
delphia, involving an African American incumbent, voters in predomi-
nantly African American areas of the city were systematically challenged by 
men canying clipboards and driving a fleet of approximately 300 sedans with 
decals designed to look like law enforcement insignia?6 During that election, 
local judges heard numerous allegations of voter intimidation and harassment 
and ultimately issued orders in two city polling places prohibiting Republican 
poll watchers from requesting registration and identification materials from 
voters?? 
Voter challenges and vote caging serve as yet another new millen-
nium mechanism to disenfranchise minority voters.38 Historically, the 
disenfranchisement devices were clearly race based.39 More contempora-
neously, however, partisan actors have proclaimed that the challenges 
were meant to prevent voter fraud and target party affiliation, more so 
than race. Indeed, recent assertions merely use "partisan" as a proxy for 
race.
40 In spite of these assertions, whether the actions are motivated by 
34. See Thomas B. Edsall, 'Ballot Security' Effects Calculated: GOP Aide Said Louisiana 
Effort 'Could Keep the Black Vote Down " WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1986, at AI. 
35. [d. (omissions in original). 
36. PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY & NAACP, THE LONG SHADOW OF JIM CROW: VOTER 
INTIMIDATION AND SUPPRESSION IN AMERICA TODAY 4-6 (2004), available at http://www.pfaw.org 
Isitesl defau Itlfi leslthe longshadowofj imcrow . pdf. 
37. Clea Benson, Cynthia Burton & Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Chaotic Day Marks End of 
Tense Campaign, PHI LA. INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2003, at A I. 
38. This Article is the third that examines various new millennium mechanisms that are used 
to disenfranchise minority voters. See also Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343 
(2010) (discussing the need for enforcement and penalties for voter deception); Gilda R. Daniels, A 
Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to Eliminating Election Administration 
Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57 (2008) (calling for 
a proactive approach to potentially disenfranchising election administration measures). 
39. See infra note 107-09 and accompanying text. 
40. The use of partisanship as a proxy for race is seen most often in the redistricting process. 
In Bartlelt v. Strickland, Justice Souter wrote in his dissent: 
If districts with minority popUlations under 50% can never count as minority-opportunity 
districts to remedy a violation of the States' obligation to provide equal electoral oppor-
tunity under § 2, States will be required under the plurality's rule to pack black voters 
into additional majority-minority districts, contracting the number of districts where ra-
cial minorities are having success in transcending racial divisions in securing their pre-
ferred representation. The object of the Voting Rights Act will now be promoting racial 
blocs, and the role of race in districting decisions as a proxy for political identification 
will be heightened by any measure. 
129 S. Ct. 1231, 1250 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 
U.S. 952,958 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting 
is performed with consciousness of race .... Electoral district lines are 'facially race neutral,' so a 
more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting 
cases than in cases of 'classifications based explicitly on race.'" (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,213 (\ 995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added)). 
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racial animus or partisanship, the result is the same. Racial minorities are 
targeted for vote challenges and those private actions constitute unconsti-
tutional state action. 
When private partisans are allowed to challenge voters in the poll-
ing site, they are engaged in determining voter eligibility, which is a 
governmental function. 41 Moreover, when private partisan organizations 
are involved in the electoral process, their allegiance to a certain candi-
date or outcome is different than the governmental goal of ensuring ac-
cess and applying the laws impartially, regardless of who the voter is 
perceived to support. Allowing private partisans to participate in voter 
eligibility decisions-which occur with the use of voter challenges-can 
confuse voters and blur the lines between appropriate public and private 
behavior.42 In the election administration context, little has been written 
to assess whether the government has given too much of its authority to 
private actors at the expense of the exercise of the fundamental right to 
vote.43 The abusive and intimidating use of voter challenges, however, 
has prompted legislation prohibiting or altering the practice.44 Accord-
ingly, the state statutes governing voter challenges and the private actor's 
access to Election Day voters require a closer look to ensure that they 
properly protect against discriminatory actions. A void currently exists in 
an analysis of this type of election administration activity. This Article 
attempts to fill that void with clear and thorough analysis of how voter 
challengers act as adjuncts of the state when issuing voter challenges and 
how courts should treat their actions as "state action.,,45 
This Article explores the level of public-private "partnership" in 
election administration and takes a particular look at private partisan's 
manipulation of state voter challenge laws. This Article argues that the 
private partisans use of government authority in determining voter eligi-
bility constitutes state action and could subject not only the private parti-
san-but also the state-to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. In Part I, this Article explores the use of 
outsourcing government functions to private organizations and discusses 
how the public-private divide has a different dynamic than other outs our-
ced areas, such as education or welfare reform, when juxtaposed against 
41. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.n. Pa. 1979) ("No activity is more indeli-
bly a public function than the holding of a political election .... "). 
42. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 
(2003); Public/Private Distinction, supra note 12, at 1250-51. 
43. See, e.g., Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America's Polling Places: How 
They Can Be Stopped, II TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 401,434-36 (2002) ("[T]he states have 
delegated to the counties the responsibility for conducting the election and maintaining order in the 
polls, and by doing so, the states have abdicated their responsibility for preventing bad things from 
happening to voters in the polls on election day."). 
44. See, e.g., S. 6134, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (authorizing canvassing boards to 
impose civil penalties for improper voter challenges). 
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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.the fundamental right to vote. Part II examines the level of race-based 
targeting in voter challenges and vote caging. Part III discusses legal 
concems<l:nd applies the state action framework to these new millennium 
mechanisms and cautions that states can be held liable for private parti-
san voter challenges. Scholars have argued both sides of the issue regard-
ing whether poll watchers engage in state action.46 This Article provides 
clarity to this discussion. Part IV recommends the elimination of voter 
challenges, or in the alternative, suggests a means to ensure that the pri-
vate partisan's role does not cede government authority. 
I. THE CEDING OF AUTHORITY: PRIV ATE INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC 
FUNCTIONS 
"Privatization is now virtually a national obsession. Hardly any 
domestic policy issue remains untouched by disputes over the scope of 
private participation in government . ... ,,47 
The public-private divide has become a blur in many areas. Private 
actors perform government functions in, inter alia, the military, educa-
tion, welfare reform, and public safety.48 Arguably, privatization is fu-
eled by two primary arguments: efficiency and lower costs and a "de-
mocratizing" effect that returns the power to local communities. 49 One 
can readily make an argument that the government can cut its costs if it 
outsources the welfare benefits program to a private company, creates a 
charter school, or allows a private company to build and run a prison. For 
example, an argument for privatizing education centers on providing a 
choice for students from low-income families to apply public school 
funds to private school tuition.5o Further, it is argued that the competition 
46. Compare Jason Belmont Conn, Of Challengers and Challenges, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 1021, 
1032-33 (2006) (exploring the role of and the decisions of poll watchers in Ohio during the 2004 
presidential election, and maintaining that the poll watchers were indeed state actors by virtue of 
their engaging in poll challenging, which is traditionally a state action), with Heather S. Heidel-
baugh, Logan S. Fisher & James D. Miller, Protecting the Integrity of the Polling Place: A Constitu-
tional Defense of Poll Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 233-34 (2009) (arguing that 
placing poll watchers in polling sites is not state action but rather a licensing process). 
47. Metzger, supra note 42, at 1369. 
48. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571-73 (2001); Kenneth J. Saltman, PUlling the Public Back in Public School-
ing: Public Schools Beyond the Corporate Model, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 9, 9-10 (2009) ("I 
consider how the corporatization of public schools redistributes economic control and cultural con-
trol from the public to private interests. I argue that these intertwined redistributions of power un-
dermine public democracy (the possibilities for the development of a more participatory and deeper 
democracy), just social transformation, and critical citizenship while exacerbating material and 
symbolic inequality."); Ian Traynor, The Privatisation of War, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2003, 2:28 
AM), http://www .guardian.co.uk!worldl2003/dec/1 O/politics.iraq/print. 
49. See Gilman, supra note 48, at 596 ("Privatization advocates ... contend that private 
companies can deliver services with greater efficiency and innovation than government at a lower 
cost. . . . Yet another strand of the privatization movement sees privatization as a democratizing 
force that returns power from the government to local communities and their mediating institutions, 
such as churches, neighborhoods, and voluntary organizations, which are better situated to address a 
community's needs."). 
50. See Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization of 
Education, 72 RU. L. REV. 381,395-96 (1992). 
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between private and public schools will create better schools for all stu-
dents regardless of income. 51 Additionally, the private school's ability to 
provide a quality education is governed by its capacity to provide a com-
petitive product.52 Arguably, "privatization of welfare converges 'the 
free market ideology of the right and the CItIzen participa-
tion/empowerment objectives of the left.",53 While each of these exam-
ples are subject to strong criticism,54 including whether the law can hold 
private companies accountable in the same manner as the government, 55 
they tend to fit neatly into the costs-democratizing paradigm. 
Most scholarship has focused on private contracts for public func-
tions, such as Medicare and Medicaid services or building prisons and 
education. 56 In these service contracts, the debate has raged over whether 
the government has granted too much power to private parties and 
whether the public benefits from the agreement. 57 Nonetheless, private 
contractors, particularly not-for-profit entities, presumably have a similar 
goal as the government, i.e., to improve services or outcomes, such as 
improving the educational system. 
Conversely, when private partisans are involved in the public func-
tion of election administration, it is somewhat of a misnomer to describe 
the relationship between the public governmental agencies and the pri-
vate group as a partnership. Partnership is the wrong characterization, 
since it would normally connote two or more groups working towards 
the same goal. 58 In the election administration context, the government 
51. See Saltman, supra note 48, at 27-28. 
52. Vallarelli, supra note 50, at 384-85 ("To remain open, schools must attract student-
consumers by providing equal or better services than competitors. Costs are reduced as each school 
responds to economic pressures and maximizes the services it can offer."). 
53. Gilman, supra note 48, at 596. 
54. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best 
interests of Children to the Fiscal interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1058-60 
(2007) (arguing that allowing private companies to collect and disburse child support payments is in 
conflict with the best interests of the child); Saltman, supra note 48, at 9 (arguing that the privatiza-
tion of schools is detrimental to education and democracy). 
55. See Gilman, supra note 48, at 603 (analyzing the detrimental effects of privatizing welfare 
benefits on the recipient's due process rights). 
56. See id. at 578-79 (examining private contracts for providing welfare). 
57. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Collateral Children: Consequence and Illegality at the inter-
section of Foster Care and Child Support, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1333, 1377-79 (2009) (arguing for 
the elimination of foster care recovery programs, which are often administered by private entities, 
because they serve no benefit to the children in foster care). 
58. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Guidebook on Successfol Practices for Poll 
Worker Recruitment, Training, and Retention [hereinafter Successfol Practices ] lists the "Pitfalls and 
Challenges" of partnering with political parties to recruit poll workers as follows: 
Some political parties use Election Day poll service as a patronage job for the party 
faithful, not necessarily appointing those most qualified and willing to serve. 
Party representatives may be tempted to work for the success of a particular candi-
date. 
Political party I ists may be submitted too late to be of use. 
Political parties often want members and others to serve as observers. 
Political party poll workers may want to work only in high-stakes elections and may 
not be reliable components of a long-term election team. 
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has a uniquely constitutional function to ensure that elections are held in 
a fair and impartial manner. 59 
Voting, however, is different from other outsourced functions-
such as education and welfare. 60 Voting is a fundamental right,61 and the 
United States Constitution mandates that the federal and state govern-
ments administer all aspects of elections. The democratic process is at its 
best when all three levels of government-federal, state, and local-
work together to protect access and integrity.62 No contractual relation-
ship exists between the private groups and the governmental agencies, 
and in most instances, the private organizations are working to improve 
the democratic process by increasing the number of eligible voters 
through voter registration drives or delivering eligible voters to the 
polls.63 
The political partisan, however, has a different goal in mind through 
his or her participation in the electoral process; to get a particular candi-
date elected or ballot measure passed.64 Once the private partisans use 
statutory authority to achieve the goal of political gamesmanship and 
influence governmental decisions on voter eligibility, the government 
has ceded its authority to private partisans at the expense of the eligible 
voter. 
In order to understand how private partisans are assuming govern-
mental power, one must first understand what authority the government 
has under the Constitution and other federal statutes in regards to elec-
tions-as well as how the authority is divided amongst the federal, state, 
and local governments. 
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, GUIDEBOOK ON SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES FOR POLL WORKER 
RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND RETENTION 49-50 (2007) [hereinafter SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES], 
available at http://www .eac .gov I assets/ll AssetManagerlSuccessful%20 Practices%2 Ofor"1020 Po II 
%20Worker''1020Recruitrnent%20Section%20 I %20Recruitrnent.pdf. 
59. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,208-09 (1992) ("[A] government has ... a compel-
ling interest in securing the right to vote freely and effectively .... "). 
60. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of 
the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. '" (quoting III. Bd. of Elections 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979»). 
61. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (proclaiming that voting is regarded 
as a fundamental political right). 
62. See generally Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, One Person. One Vote: Protecting Access to the 
Franchise Through the Effective Administration of Election Procedures and Protections, 40 URB. 
LAW. 269 (2008) (discussing ways that public and private entities can work together to ensure fair 
elections, focusing on advancing participation in the language minority community and Section 203 
of the Voting Rights Act). 
63. ld. at 278. 
64. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (1979) ("The poll-watcher performs a dual 
function on Election Day. On the one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political party, 
his job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other hand, becatlSe exercise of his 
authority promotes an honest election, the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of the 
vote."). 
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A. The Federal Government 
The federal, state, and local governments share in the administration 
of elections. 65 On the federal level, government agencies enforce various 
voting rights statutes66 and Constitutional amendments. 67 Notwithstand-
ing state authority to develop election administration laws governing 
"The Time[] , Place[] and Manner of elections," Congress-under the 
Elections Clause-maintains authority to "make or alter" state regulation 
of federal elections.68 
It is widely understood that the Constitution contemplated that fed-
eral and state governments would coordinate election administration is-
sues, with any federal decisions reigning supreme.69 Recent cases inter-
preting the Elections Clause reinforce Congress's broad authority to 
regulate all aspects of elections.70 Accordingly, Congress has the power 
to develop and supersede state election regulations. Additionally, in 
Smiley v. Holm/I the Court noted that Congress's Elections Clause 
power allows it to "supplement ... state regulations or ... substitute its 
own."n 
65. However, elections are primarily a local government function. See Note, Toward A 
Greater State Role In Election Administration, 118 HAR v. L. REV. 2314, 2323 (2005) [hereinafter 
Greater State Role]; see also Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 41, at 434-36 ("If the states do not 
assume the responsibility for conducting effective elections when the counties fail to do so, then the 
United States Congress should consider whether federal civil rights voting laws should be expanded 
to include the deprivations of voting rights at the polls ... and should consider similarly expanding 
the unquestionably successful federal observer program."). 
66. Federal agencies enforce various statutes that pertain to voting, such as the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act. 42 U .S.C. § 1973 
et seq. (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 (2006). Additionally, the Help 
America Vote Act spawned the Election Assistance Commission, which provides guidance and best 
practices for state and local election administrations and provides funds for improving the election 
process. 42 U.S.C. § 15381 (2006). 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1-2 ("The right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation."). 
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators."). Congress can regulate the elections of Representatives and Senators. United States v. 
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482 (1917); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1879); United States 
v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 287 (W.D. La. 1963); Commonwealth ex rei. Dummit v. O'Connell, 
181 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Ky. 1944). 
69. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384 ("[T]he power ... may be exercised as and when Congress sees 
fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the 
regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them. This is implied in the power to 'make or al-
ter."'). 
70. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001) ("[The Elections Clause] encompasses 
matters like 'notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and 
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication 
of election returns. ", (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932))). 
71. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
72. Id. at 366-67. In Smiley v. Holm, Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
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Together, the federal and state governments have the constitutional 
authority to regulate the election process, which includes voter eligibil-
ity. While Congress has used its constitutional power to implement laws 
that govern aspects of election administration,13 it is the states' responsi-
bility to implement those laws in a nondiscriminatory and fair manner. 74 
B. The State Government 
In election administration matters, state and local governments bear 
the lion's share of the responsibility. Article I, Section IV of the United 
States Constitution grants the ability to administer elections to the 
states,15 which provides extensive obligations to ensure that elections are 
conducted impartially and accurately. 76 
Perhaps one of the most powerful and important responsibilities of 
state administrators is to make an accurate and almost instantaneous de-
termination of the eligibility of a citizen to cast a ballot. In most in-
stances, a voter 10, signature, or other form of verification is all that is 
needed. 77 When a voter is challenged, the process changes tremendously, 
shifting the power from the state to the challenger and placing the voter 
on the defensive. The local administrator is tasked with the on the spot 
determination and the responsibility of communicating any problems to 
the county and state administrators, who, if needed, will also communi-
cate with federal government agencies for assistance. Accordingly, fed-
eral offices also communicate any problems with the state, and local 
election administrators; in some instances, correcting for clear discrimi-
natory practices, and in others, leaving the voter stranded on the road to 
full political participation.78 
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a 
complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation 
to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud 
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making 
and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to 
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the 
fundamental right involved. 
Id. at 366. 
73. Congress utilized its Elections Clause authority when it enacted the NVRA and HA V A. 
See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 4, cI. I. 
74. The National Voter Registration Act demands that its measures are implemented in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. 42 U.S.C. § I 973gg-6(b)(I) (2006). 
75. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 4, cl. I; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Greater State 
Role, supra note 65, at 2323. 
76. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. See generally J. Kenneth Blackwell & Kenneth A. Kluk-
owski, The Other Voting Right: Protecting Every Citizen's Vote by SaJeguarding the Integrity oJthe 
Ballot Box, 28 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 107 (2009); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the 
Secretary: The Cn/cial Role oj State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to 
Democracy, 27 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343,355-61 (2008); Raquel A. Rodriguez, Reflections oj 
Another Bush v. Gore Lawyer, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 631,636 (2010). 
77. See, e.g., Voter Identification Requirements, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.orgiLegislaturesElectionslElectionsCampaigns/StateRequirements 
forVoterlD/tabidlI6602IDefault.aspx#in (last updated Sept. 30, 20 I 0). 
78. Voting Rights Act: Sections 6 and 8 - The Federal Examiner and Observer Program: 
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Most states refer to the persons primarily responsible for the Elec-
tion Day experience as poll workers. 79 The poll workers, inter alia, open 
the polling sites, welcome voters, and provide the necessary voting mate-
rials-such as actual ballots or access to the electronic system employed 
in the jurisdiction.8o Once the polls close, the poll workers must secure 
the actual ballots and/or the voting machines and deliver the machines 
and ballots to the central facility for the official Election Day count.81 For 
all their hard work, poll workers are only paid approximately $100 for a 
more than 12-hour day in some cases.82 
On the local level, poll workers protect the overall integrity of the 
voting process. A well-trained poll worker is aware of state and federal 
election regulations, as well as how to fairly administer and handle any 
potential disputes. Poll workers must consistently apply fair and egalitar-
ian principles in a nondiscriminatory way and avoid the appearance of 
impropriety. They must also know clearly how to administer the ballot 
and provisional ballots, determine voter eligibility, and have a superior 
familiarity with voting procedures and voting technology.s3 In this new 
millennium, particularly with the advent of the electronic voting ma-
chine, computer literacy is crucial to a smooth voting process. 
The public and private entities must work together in order to facili-
tate a smooth election process. It has become evident, however, that not 
all entities are working toward the same goal. 84 The unique placement of 
private partisans inside the polling place with the authority to challenge 
voters-and as such, determine whether a person is eligible to vote-
aligns the private actions with government authority.85 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Congo 17-19 (2005) (statement of Bany H. Weinberg, Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, 
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't. of Justice) (stating that federal observers are the 
"eyes and ears of the Justice Department"). For a discussion of the relationship between federal 
observers and the election process, see infra Part IV.C. 
79. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 12302 (West 2010) (allowing the state to recruit student poll 
workers). In New York, they are referred to as "inspectors" and "poll clerks." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-
420 (McKinney 2007). In Alabama, poll workers are referred to as "inspectors" and "clerks." ALA. 
CODE § 17-8-5 (2007). 
80. See SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES, supra note 58, at 7. 
81. See generally id. 
82. In Alabama, clerks and inspectors are paid at least $75 and $100 per day respectively for 
statewide elections. ALA. CODE § 17-8-12 (2007); cf N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-420 (McKinney 2007) 
(poll workers are paid $200 for working on election day and an additional amount for attending poll 
worker training); WIS. STAT. § 7.03(1)(a) (2004) (election officials are paid "a reasonable daily 
compensation"). In Madison, Wisconsin, "a reasonable daily compensation" is presently $11.66 per 
hour. MADISON CITY CLERK'S OFFICE, SERVING AS AN ELECTION OFFICIAL IN THE CITY OF 
MADISON, available at http://www.cityofmadison.com/election/poIlWorkersldocumentslElection 
OfficialBrochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,20 I 0). 
83. See SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES, supra note 58, at 7. 
84. See Emmert et aI., supra note 19, at 8 (detailing the ineffective administration of elections 
in the United States). 
85. See id. at 24--25. 
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C. Voter Challenge/Poll Watcher Statutes 
State statutes determine who may remain inside a polling site to ob-
serve the electoral process. 86 Poll watcher eligibility is determined by 
state laws that allow persons of various positions, i.e., political party, 
political candidate, or concerned citizen, to view the actual voting proc-
ess.87 Some statutes are extremely liberal, allowing "[a]ny member of the 
public," except a candidate, to observe the election,88 while others limit 
the observers to voters and election officials. 89 
Like most states, Florida law allows one poll watcher from each 
party and one poll watcher representing each candidate to view the vot-
ing process.90 Further, a Florida poll watcher may challenge any voter's 
right to vote if done "in good faith,,,91 provided the challenger signs an 
oath that details the challenger's name, address, political affiliation, and 
reason for the challenge.92 Once offered, the challenged voter is allowed 
to cast a provisional ballot.93 Although filing a frivolous challenge is a 
first-degree misdemeanor in Florida, an exception is given for electors or 
poll workers making the challenge "in good faith.,,94 
The process of issuing a challenge is rather involved. If a challenge 
is offered, the poll workers then engage in a time-consuming process, 
which takes them away from the business of processing eligible voters.95 
In some states, the challenger has to make his challenge in writing on a 
form that is provided for the purpose of challenging, and the challenged 
voter must respond with an affidavit. 96 In most instances, the challenged 
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3) (2008). Scholars have 
argued that states have failed to undertake their responsibilities in this arena by delegating the duty 
to maintain order at elections to counties. See Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 41, at 434 (arguing 
that the states need to use their authority to reb'll late the activity of elections today to stop future 
problems). 
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (2007); FLA. STAT. § \02.031 (3) (2008). 
88. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2004)("Any member of the public may be present at any 
polling place ... except a candidate whose name appears on the ballot at the polling place .... "). 
89. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 3-31-37(a) (2010) ("[N]o person, other than the election officers 
and voters going to the election room to vote and returning therefrom, may be or remain within three 
hundred feet of the outside entrance to the building housing the polling place while the polls are 
open."). 
90. FLA. STAT. § 101.131(1)(2008). 
91. FLA. STAT. § 101.111(2) (2008). 
92. FLA. STAT. § 101.1 I I (I)(a) (2008). 
93. FLA. STAT. § 101.1 I 1(I)(b)(I) (2008). 
94. FLA. STAT. § 101.111(2) (2008) ("[E]lectors and poll watchers shall not be subject to 
liability for any action taken in good faith and in furtherance of any activity or duty permitted of 
such electors and poll watchers by law."). This exception essentially allows questionable challenges 
to stand without criminal repercussions. Id. For other examples of disenfranchising methods that 
avoid criminal prosecution, see generally Daniels, supra note 38. 
95. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 223 (2008) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that a voter ID law increases the likelihood of delay at the polls since any minor 
discrepancy between a voter's photo identification card and the registration may lead to a challenge). 
96. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:15-18.1 (West 1999) (permitting a challenged voter to 
establish a right to vote by a signed affidavit detailing voter qualifications or a presentation of a 
suitable identifying document); N.C. GEN. STAT. § I 63-85(b) (2008) (requiring a challenge made in 
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voter may vote if it is determined by a majority vote of the poll workers 
that the voter is eligible.97 Once a challenge is issued, a poll worker must 
resolve the challenge before the person can vote. 98 Thus, the poll workers 
decision regarding voter eligibility is reliant upon the private declaration 
of ineligibility. It then forces the voter to prove her identity. The inability 
to do so, could disenfranchise an eligible voter not because she is ineligi-
ble but for a myriad of reasons unassociated with eligibility, such as lack 
of an ID when the jurisdiction does not require identification. 
D. Private Actors 
Private partisan involvement in the exercise of the franchise is not 
new. Prior to the Civil War, most states did not require voters to prove 
their eligibility prior to Election Day.99 One scholar has noted: 
Until 1888, political parties printed and distributed the ballots in 
each of the United States. Besides discouraging split-ticket voting 
and encouraging strong party organizations ... the party ballot in-
sured illiterates the right to vote. Nevertheless, reformers, who were 
more concerned with eliminating fraud than safeguarding the rights 
of illiterates, instituted the secret ballot .... 100 
Voters arrived at the polls with required documentation, including 
witnesses that could attest to their eligibility.101 During this period, Re-
publicans feared voter fraud promoted voter registration, while Democ-
rats argued for extending voting hourS.102 During the Jim Crow era, the 
federal government had to step in to protect the right to vote as a result of 
the Black Codes, Jim Crow laws, and death threats. 
As chronicled in Burson v. Freeman,103 once the country moved 
from oral vote to paper ballots, private partisan involvement began to 
writing, under oath, and on prescribed fonns); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-86(d) (2008) (pennitting a 
challenged voter to appear at a hearing in person or through affidavit). 
97. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2006) (providing that the election 
judges shall provide a provisional ballot to a person whom a majority of the judges believe is not 
entitled to vote), held unconstitutional by Boustani v. Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ohio 
2006) (holding that provisions requiring that naturalized citizens present a certificate of naturaliza-
tion upon challenge or otherwise cast a provisional ballot violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
98. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.19 (West 2006) (providing that if a challenged 
person shows up to vote and establishes to the satisfaction of the judges that he or she is entitled to 
vote, he or she shall be pennitted to vote). 
99. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
lNTHE UNITED STATES 151 (2000). During the colonial era, the vote was reserved for white men and 
in some states only those men who owned property. See id. at 5. The later requirement of voter 
registration was due in part to the increase in urban areas where "voters were less likely to be known 
personally to election officials." See id. at 152. 
100. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION 
AND THE EsTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 51 (1974). 
10 I. See KEYSSAR, supra note 99, at 151. 
102. See id. at 152. In post Civil War Chicago, RepUblicans hired individuals to "check polling 
places" and offered a $300 reward to those who would assist in convicting persons who voted ille-
gally. But, all those who were accused were acquitted.ld. at 153-54. 
103. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
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overly influence and destroy the free exercise of the right to vote. 104 The 
Court wrote: 
Within 20 years of the fonnation of the Union, most States had in-
corporated the paper ballot into their electoral system .... Wishing to 
gain influence, political parties began to produce their own ballots for 
voters. These ballots were often printed with flamboyant colors, dis-
tinctive designs, and emblems so that they could be recognized at a 
distance. State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily 
thwarted-the vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of 
the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box. Thus, 
the evils associated with the earlier viva voce system reinfected the 
election process; the failure of the law to secure secrecy opened the 
d b 'b d"'d' 105 oor to n ery an mtlml atlOn. 
While the practice of vote caging dates back to the 1950s, the use of 
race-based voter challenges can be traced to the post-Civil War era. Be-
ginning in the 1860s, Republicans enacted vote challenging mechanisms 
with the mission of addressing fraud, while the Democrats responded 
with arguments that the Republican passed laws were "an act of hostility 
to the Democratic party.,,106 
Still, the race-based voter targeting was both blatant and widespread. 
As an example, in 1865, the Florida legislature instituted measures de-
signed for the sole purpose of denying the franchise to freed Blacks. 107 
Likewise, after record black enfranchisement in 1867, white legislators 
adopted a statute that granted poll watchers the ability to challenge voter 
eligibility, stating: 
If any person offering to vote shall be challenged, as not qualified, by 
an inspector or by any other elector, one of the board shall declare to 
the person challenged the qualifications of an elector. If such person 
shall claim that he is qualified, and the challenge be not withdrawn, 
one of the inspectors shall administer to him an oath prescribed by 
I 108 aw. 
In Tiryak v. Jordan,109 the court found that, although the state is re-
sponsible for the administration of elections, "[t]he statutory scheme in 
certain instances delegates aspects of that responsibility to the political 
\04. See id. at 200-01. 
lOS. ld. 
\06. KEYSSAR, supra note 99, at 155. Beginning in 1866, the Republican and Democratic 
parties set the stage for partisan battles over access and integrity for centuries to come. See id. at 
152-53. 
107. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, REPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS ON 
THE URGENT NEED FOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTISAN POLL WATCHERS (2004), available at 
http://www.advancementproject.orglsites/defaultlfilesl AP-VSchallenge.pdf. Racial voting restric-
tions are as old as the Confederacy. See id. (citing FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. VI, § I (limiting the 
right to vote to white males)). 
108. Id. at 108. 
109. 472 F. Supp. 822 (1979). 
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parties. This delegation is a legislative recognition of 'the critical role 
played by political parties in the process of selecting and electing candi-
dates for state and national office. ",110 The "critical role" begins to im-
pede upon government authority in the area of partisan poll watchers. 
II. RACE BASED CHALLENGES AND VOTER CAGING 
As discussed, supra, voter challenges have been used to target racial 
minorities. The practice of partisan voter challenges rests upon the dis-
criminatory selection of voters based on geography, i.e., racially segre-
gated neighborhoods and racial identification. As a first step, political 
operatives utilize voter caging to capture the voters and ultimately ques-
tion their eligibility. 
Although gaining recent prominence, caging is not new. The politi-
cal tactic was used as a so-called "ballot security" measure as early as the 
1950s. III Voter caging often goes hand in hand with voter intimidation 112 
and deception tactics. I 13 For instance, as discussed, supra, while the Re-
publican National Committee was defending a lawsuit in Louisiana, a 
memo released from a party official indicated its intentions to suppress 
the minority vote. The relevant part of the memo read: "I would guess 
that this program will eliminate at least 60-80,000 folks from the rolls ... 
. If it's a close race ... which I'm assuming it is, this could keep the 
110. [d. at 823-24 (quoting Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 195 (1979)). 
III. See Davidson et aI., supra note 15, at 559. Voter caging was recognized in Arizona in the 
1950s and 1960s as a Republican political tool to exclude African Americans and Mexican Ameri-
cans. [d. at 543. The Arizona example also implicated former Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
during his confirmation hearings. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD 
STORY OF THE NIXON ApPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 271 (2001). In 1962, 
the Republican National Committee expanded this approach and engaged in a national voter caging 
campaign named "Operation Eagle Eye," which targeted minority voters in urban areas in battle-
ground states. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON ET AL., REPUBLICAN BALLOT SECURITY PROGRAMS: VOTE 
PROTECTION OR MINORITY VOTE SUPPRESSION-OR BOTH?: A REPORT TO THE CENTER FOR 
VOTING RIGHTS & PROTECTION 25 (2004). For example, in the I 960s in Chicago the RNC planned 
to have more than 10,000 poll-watchers for the 3,552 voting precincts. [d. at 26 n.5 (citing 250,000 
Accredited to Watch City Polls, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 1964, at I, 14). 
112. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'! Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578-79 
(D.N.J. 2009) ("Voter intimidation presents an ongoing threat to the participation of minority indi-
viduals in the political process, and continues to pose a far greater danger to the integrity of that 
process than the type of voter fraud the RNC is prevented from addressing by the Decree."); Jo 
Becker, GOP Challenging Voter Registrations: Civil Rights Groups Accuse Republicans of Trying to 
Disenfranchise Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A5 (introducing evidence that Republi-
cans have "used tactics that were aimed at intimidating minority voters and suppressing their 
votes."). 
113. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note III ("There are several noteworthy characteristics of 
these [vote caging] programs. They focus on minority precincts almost exclusively. There is often 
only the flimsiest evidence that vote fraud is likely to be perpetrated in such precincts. In addition to 
encouraging the presence of sometimes intimidating RepUblican poll watchers or challengers who 
may slow down voting lines and embarrass potential voters by asking those humiliating questions, 
these programs have sometimes posted people in official-looking uniforms with badges and side 
arms who question voters about their citizenship or their registration. In addition, warning signs may 
be posted near the polls, or radio ads may be targeted to minority listeners containing dire threats of 
prison terms for people who are not properly registered-messages that seem designed to put minor-
ity voters on the defensive."). See generally Daniels, supra note 38. 
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black vote down considerably.,,114 Similarly, in 1981, "the Republican 
National Committee sent letters to predominantly black neighborhoods in 
New Jersey, and when 45,000 letters were returned as undeliverable, the 
[RNC] compiled a challenge list to remove those voters from the 
rolls.,,115 More recently, prior to the 2004 presidential election the Re-
publican National Committee used vote caging methods to compile a list 
of approximately 35,000 persons. 116 The RNC gathered its voter chal-
lenge list of 35,000 persons "by sending letters to registered voters in 
precincts with a high concentration of minorities, in this case inner-city 
areas in Cleveland, and recording the names of those voters for whom 
the letter was returned as undeliverable." I 17 
In Spencer v. Blackwell,1I8 a recent voter challenge case, African 
American voters sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against 
Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, seeking a court order prohib-
iting voter challenges inside the polling place. I 19 The plaintiffs alleged 
that voter challenges would be used to discriminate against African 
American voters in Hamilton County, Ohio. 12o They asserted that the 
Hamilton County Board of Elections and the Hamilton County Republi-
can Party were working together to discriminate against African Ameri-
can voters on Election Day.121 The Hamilton County Republican Party 
had petitioned to have hundreds of poll challengers present during the 
2004 presidential election to challenge voter eligibility and prevent 
fraud. 122 Tim Burke, Chair of the Hamilton County Board of Elections, 
testified that two-thirds of the poll challengers were designated for pre-
dominately African-American precincts. 123 The court found that the Ohio 
statutes governing voter challenges and the Secretary of State's guidance 
114. See Edsall, supra note 34 (omissions in original). 
115. Becker, supra note 112. The Democratic National Committee and Republican National 
Committee entered into a Consent Decree in 1982 in which the RNC agreed to: 
[R]efrain from undertaking any ballot security activities in polling places or election dis-
tricts where the racial or ethnic composition of such districts is a factor in the decision to 
conduct, or the actual conduct of, such activities there and where a purpose or significant 
effect of such activities is to deter qualified voters from voting; and the conduct of such 
activities disproportionately in or directed toward districts that have a substantial propor-
tion of racial or ethnic popUlations shall be considered relevant evidence of the existence 
of such a factor and purpose. 
Consent Order at '1I2(e), Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. SUpp. 2d 575 
(D.N.J. Nov. I, 1982) (No. 81-3876). 
116. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. SUpp. 2d 575, 582 (D.N.J. 
2009). 
117. ld. 
118. 347 F. SUpp. 2d 528 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
119. ld. at 529. In Ohio, poll watchers must take an oath, be a resident of the state and a "quali-
fied elector." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (LexisNexis 2010). See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 
529-30. 
120. ld. at 529. 
121. ld. 
122. See id. at 530. 
123. ld. The court heard evidence that "14% of new voters in a majority white location will 
face a challenger ... , but 97% of new voters in a majority African-American voting location will see 
such a challenger." Id. . 
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imposed a severe burden on Ohio voters and was not narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest. 124 The court opined that "questionable 
enforceability of the State's and County's policies regarding good faith 
challenges and ejection of disruptive challengers from the polls, there 
exists an enormous risk of chaos, delay, intimidation, and pandemonium 
inside the polls and in the lines out the door.,,12s 
In the 2010 midterm elections, reports of voter intimidation, voter 
suppression and increased challenges were numerous. 126 The outcome of 
these types of measures are a decrease in voter participation. The threat 
of voter challenges and voter caging can deter eligible voters from going 
to the polls.127 Additionally, the heightened scrutiny associated with 
voter challenges also has a deterrent and intimidating effect. 128 
When election officials accept voter challenges that exhibit a pattern 
of race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination, the practice could be 
found volatile of the Equal Protection Clause and other statutes. 129 Much 
like discriminatory peremptory challenges in jury selection,130 the current 
voter challenge system has created a sort of peremptory voter challenges. 
In this regard, voter challenges are similar to peremptory challenges used 
in criminal and civil trials and should be considered peremptory voter 
challenges because of their use to eliminate voters based solely on race 
and the ability to utilize the challenges without proffering a basis for the 
strike. 
124. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
125. [d. at 535. The Court has repeatedly recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process." Id. at 534 (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,358 (1997». 
126. See, e.g., Krissah Thompson, Some Complaints Surface Amid Stepped-Up Efforts to 
Monitor Voting Fraud, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010 ("In Minnesota, where conservative groups had 
run radio ads and offered $500 rewards to those willing to tum in anyone prosecuted for voter fraud, 
a few poll watchers aggressively challenged voters until they were confronted by election protection 
volunteers, lawyers monitoring the election reported."); see also Ian Urbina, Reports of Intimidation 
and Electronic Problems Surface at Polls Across the u.s., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, ('''One of the 
most worrisome things we're seeing is an uptick in voter intimidation and misinformation compared 
to prior elections,' said Wendy Weiser, director of the voting rights and elections project at the 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University.") 
127. Voter Registration and List Maintenance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of 
the H. Administration Committee, II Oth Congo (2007) (statement of Joseph D. Rich, Director, Fair 
Housing Project) ("Targeted at traditionally disenfranchised voters, this practice relies on voter 
'challenge' laws to blindly question the ability of eligible voters to cast a ballot. While dressed in the 
garb of protecting against the 'voter fraud,' caging is realIy a cynical way to undermine the most 
fundamental right of all Americans - the right to participate freely in our democracy - for partisan 
gain. It is especially pernicious because it has almost invariably been used to suppress the vote of 
minority voters."). 
128. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 590 
(D.N.J. 2009) (discussing partisan intimidation tactics including those associated with voter chal-
lenges). 
129. See generally id. 
130. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,82 (1986). 
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In Batson v. Kentucky,13l the Supreme Court found that a prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude racial minorities from serv-
ing on a jury violated the Equal Protection Clause. 132 In a subsequent 
case, the Court focused its attention on whether the defendant, when ex-
ercising peremptory challenges, should be considered a state actor under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 The court held that the defendant should 
be considered a state actor because the defendant used the peremptory 
challenge procedures with "the overt, significant assistance of state offi-
cials.,,134 The dissenters in the case argued that the use of peremptory 
challenges equaled private action because the decision to use the peremp-
tory challenge is left to the defendant's discretion. 135 
In many ways, voter challenges are similar to peremptory chal-
lenges due to the lack of an evidentiary standard before denying a fun-
damental right. 136 Once the government allows private actors to make an 
assertion regarding whether a citizen lives at a certain address or has a 
"belief' that the person is otherwise ineligible, it has outsourced its 
authority and granted the private actors governmental power. 
III. PRIVATE PARTISAN ACTIONS AS STATE ACTION 
"The timing of the challenges is so transparent that it defies com-
mon sense to believe the purpose is anything but political chicanery. ,,137 
In elections, private partisans participate to the extent that the law 
allows, i.e., laws governing electioneering, private access to the polls, 
and what voters can wear to the polls.138 States should become wary of 
allowing voter challengers. In the exercise of race based or racially tar-
geted voter challenges, where partisanship is used as a proxy for race, 
courts have implied liability for both public and private entities. 139 Pri-
vate partisan racially targeted voter challenges could leave public 
authorities liable for their involvement in denying citizens the right to 
vote. 
131. 476 U.s. 79 (1986). 
132. Jd. at 83-84. 
133. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,620 (1991). 
134. Jd. at 622 (quoting Tulsa Prof'1 Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)). 
135. Jd. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Scalia dissented arguing that the challenge allows private parties to exclude potential jurors 
and is left wholly within the discretion of the litigant, and considered it "an enclave of private action 
in a govemment-managed proceeding." Jd. at 632-34. 
136. See supra notes 134-35. 
137. Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077,1081 (D. Mont. 2008). 
138. Kimberly J. Tucker, "You Can't Wear That to Vote ": The Constitutionality of State Laws 
Prohibiting the Wearing of Political Message Buttons at Polling Places, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
61, 61-62 (2006) (arguing that the state statute that bans private partisans access to political buttons 
at polling places is unconstitutional because it violates free speech). 
139. See Mont. Democratic Party, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. The Montana Democratic Party 
sought a temporary restraining order to stop the Montana Republican Party from challenging 6,000 
registered voters who were predominately young and registered Democrats. Jd. 
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The Supreme Court has applied the notion that a private actor per-
forming a governmental function can be deemed a state action in the area 
of election law-most notably in areas of race discrimination. In the first 
of the white primary cases,140 the Supreme Court found that a Texas stat-
ute that excluded blacks from participating in the state primary that was 
run by the state Democratic Party constituted a state action in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. 141 In the landmark case Smith v. AU-
wright,142 the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he [political] party takes the 
character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state stat-
utes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are 
rfi db 1·· 1 ,,143 pe orme y a po ltIca party. 
A. Nexus between the State and the Private Action 
The state's ceding of authority to private parties in the area of voter 
eligibility places governmental power in the private partisan and strips 
the challenged voter of her rights and the expectation of participating in 
the electoral practice free from discrimination. In determining whether 
state action has occurred, the Supreme Court looks at two distinct issues: 
whether "the deprivation . . . [was] caused by the exercise of some right 
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the 
state or by a person for whom the State is responsible," and whether "the 
party charged with the deprivation ... [is] a person who may fairly be 
said to be a state actor.,,144 
Under this test, the function of voter challenges can be deemed state 
action: It is the state statutes that provide for voter challenges, and, the 
action itself is derived from an inherently public-private relationship. In 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 145 the Court found that "[a ]lthough 
private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not 
rise, by itself, to the level of state action, our cases have found state ac-
tion when private parties make extensive use of state procedures with 
'the overt, significant assistance of state officials. ",146 In Tiryak, a § 1983 
case involving voter challenges, the court found that "[n]o activity is 
more indelibly a public function than the holding of a political elec-
140. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,467-70 (1953) (holding that excluding blacks from 
"pre-primary elections" constituted unconstitutional state action under the Civil War Amendments); 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (the Court found that "delegation to a party of the 
power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make 
the party's action the action of the state"); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (striking 
down the Texas statute that denied blacks an opportunity to participate in a state primary). 
141. Nixon, 273 U.S. at 540-41. 
142. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
143. Id. at 663. 
144. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982). 
145. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
146. Id. at 622 (citation omitted). 
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tion ... cases make it clear that the conduct of the elections themselves is 
an [e]xclusively public function.,,147 
The crucial question is whether enough governmental involvement 
exists to convert private discrimination into state action. The Supreme 
Court has held that an activity constitutes state action when the State 
exercised "coercive power,,148 or when a private actor operates as a "will-
ful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.,,149 Once the 
government allows private actors to make an assertion regarding whether 
a citizen lives in a certain address or "believes" that the person is other-
wise ineligible, it has outsourced its authority and granted the private 
actors governmental power. It is the government's responsibility to de-
termine whether a voter is eligible to vote, not a private party's. 
Notwithstanding the use of peremptory electoral challenges, the 
state action doctrine should serve as a deterrent to those who wish to use 
public power in a discriminatory manner. 150 The Supreme Court has 
found that even peripheral involvement could equate to an Equal Protec-
tion violation. 151 The state's bestowal of authority, here, allows persons 
other than the state to determine the eligibility of voters. In the landmark 
case Smith v. AI/wright, the Supreme Court found that "the [political] 
party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it 
by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because 
they are performed by a political party.,,152 More contemporaneously, in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass 'n, 153 
the Court found state action where the private actor received its power 
from the state. 154 Here, it is the state that allows private actors to serve as 
voter challengers and challenge voters-thus, granting power to the pri-
vate actors. 
147. Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
148. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
149. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966». 
ISO. The Supreme Court has held that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate." Harper v. 
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (outlawing the poll tax). 
lSI. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966) ("This is not to say, however, that 
the involvement of the State need be either exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court 
has found state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even 
though the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-
operative forces leading to the constitutional violation."). 
152. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (\944). 
153. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
154. Id. at 290-91, 296 ("We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is 
controlled by an 'agency of the State,' when it has been delegated a public function by the State, 
when it is 'entwined with governmental policies,' or when government is 'entwined in [its] man-
agement or control. ''') (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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In cases where the court has not found state action, it acknowledged 
the difficulty in making the designation. 155 The courts have neglected to 
find a state action violation primarily in the area of inner affairs of politi-
cal parties. 156 The Supreme Court and lower courts have found that the 
political party's decision on the seating and selection of delegates does 
not constitute state action.157 Here the discrepancy does not lie between 
the political party and its internal rules governing delegate selection or 
primary dates, but the party's manipulation of state laws to discriminate 
against voters on the basis of race. The use of the state statute to provide 
access to the voters and to allow the parties to challenge voters based on 
a list that was developed on a discriminatory premise, and the State's 
approval of the individual challenges such that voters eligibility is ques-
tioned and in some cases disallowed, clearly places the political party in 
the position of acting on behalf of the State and its actions can be attrib-
uted to the State. 
B. Private Partisans Performing Governmental Functions 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that the act of regu-
lating voting is a governmental responsibility.158 The Federal Constitu-
tion grants the authority to administer elections to the federal and state 
government, which convenes the responsibility to register, monitor, and 
count ballots pursuant to the rules, regulations and statutes those gov-
ernmental entities prescribe. 159 Clearly, administering the vote and access 
to the voting process is an exclusive governmental function. 
Determining whether a particular voter is eligible, therefore, is 
likewise a governmental duty. The use of voter challenges outsources 
155. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("What is 'private' action and what 
is 'state' action is not always easy to detennine. Conduct that is fonnally 'private' may become so 
entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become 
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.") (citation omitted); see also Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556,571-74 (1974) (failing to find state action because the 
record was not conclusive on whether the nonexclusive use of recreational facilities by all-white 
private schools, private school-affiliated groups, and all-white non-school organizations was enough 
state action to warrant judicial intervention on constitutional grounds). 
156. See Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a political party's involvement in a primary election did not constitute state action but 
instead constituted internal party affairs which are not subject to § 1983 enforcement). 
157. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (holding thatthe First Amendment protects 
a national political party's delegate selection rules); Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 
843 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a challenge to the gender allocation rule was not permitted for 
delegate selection); Ripon Soc'y., Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated when a national party did not make presi-
dential nominations based on a defined constituency of one person-one vote). 
158. United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 283, 285-86 (W.O. La. 1963) (holding that 
the "manner of holding elections" has been understood as covering the entire election process, from 
voter registration to the counting ofbaIlots); see also Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (finding 
Congress's Elections Clause authority "well settled ... to override state regulations" involving 
federal election administration matters); Ex parle Coy, 127 U.S. 731,755 (1888). 
159. The Supreme Court described the state's abdication of responsibility as an "evil." Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953). 
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this responsibility to private actors. The voter challenger's use of dis-
criminatory means to develop the list of voters to oppose promotes race 
discrimination and can make the state responsible for the private party's 
actions; thus, the private partisans are involved in a governmental func-
tion. 
C. Scrutinizing Voter Challengers: Addressing the Vote Fraud Claim 
While this Article fervently argues that the use of racially targeted 
voter challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause, it also recognizes 
that the level of scrutiny applied and the case-by-case analysis that the 
courts employ will determine whether a violation has occurred. 160 A gov-
ernmental or private agency would argue that it narrowly tailored its 
voter challenge statutes and had a compelling state interest in allowing 
voter challengers in the polling place and that state and federal authori-
ties would require adherence to the law. 161 Moreover, it would assert that 
the private party's actions did not constitute state action under the Equal 
Protection Clause. In this instance, even under the most forgiving stan-
dard, it is difficult to ascertain how the state could meet its burden. 162 
Additionally, proponents of voter challenges will argue that the 
challenges serve as a voter integrity measure that helps prevent fraud. 163 
160. In Nat 'I Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 179---81, 195 (1988), a state 
university imposed disciplinary sanctions against its basketball coach in compliance with National 
Collegiate Athletic Association rules and recommendations. The Court found that this action did not 
tum Association's otherwise private conduct into "state action," and thus Association could not be 
held liable for violation of coach's civil rights. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. u.s. Olym· 
pic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 526-27, 547 (1987), the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and 
the International Olympic Committee brought suit under the Amateur Sports Act against a California 
corporation and various individuals to restrain their use of the term "Olympics" to describe an ath· 
letic competition they sponsored. The Court said that the USOC was not a government actor. 
161. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). "The Court also has recognized that a 
State 'indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.'" Id. 
(quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). "The 
Court has thus 'upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process itself.'" Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). "In other words, it has recognized that a State has a compelling 
interest in ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the election proc-
ess." Id. The Court further held that "[t]o survive strict scrutiny, however, a State must do more than 
assert a compelling state interest-it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted 
interest." /d. 
162. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding that during a challenge to a 
state election law a court "must weigh 'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate' against 
'the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,' 
taking into consideration 'the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plain-
tiffs rights. "'). 
163. While voter fraud once was a distinct problem in this country, it has certainly become less 
of a threat to democracy. See KEYSSAR supra note 99, at 123. As early as 1934, noted election 
administration expert Joseph Harris found that voter fraud was disappearing and "[h]onest elections 
have become the established rule in most sections of the country." See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 317 (1934). In one instance, the Court held that voter 
fraud in Indiana has never been a problem. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 
181,194 (2008). 
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To these arguments, courts have already spoken. For example, in De-
mocratic Nat'l Committee v. Republican Nat'l Committee,l64 the court 
found that the effect of the alleged incidents of fraud "pale[ d] in com-
parison to the damage that would likely result from allowing the types of 
ballot security initiatives that are currently prohibited by the Consent 
Decree.,,165 
The strongest response to such arguments is that although permit-
ting statutory voter challenges helps prevent voter fraud, the elimination 
of this ill is not the responsibility of private actors or partisan organiza-
tions. Instead, it is the government's sole responsibility to prescribe the 
manner of elections and to protect the process. Moreover, in the recent 
Supreme Court case Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Board,166 the 
Court noted that the State of Indiana had not encountered any docu-
mented reports of voter fraud. 167 In fact, once implemented, the voter ID 
law that had the stated compelling reason of preventing fraud-much 
like the voter challenges-was more effective at eliminating eligible 
voters. Likewise, as other litigation has brought to light, so-called ballot 
security measures tend to interfere with the balloting process and do not 
promote voter participation and confidence. 168 
The precision that is used to eliminate, frustrate and intimidate eli-
gible voters and, in most cases minority voters, should serve as a credible 
reason to consider curtailing, if not eliminating, the position of voter 
challengers. Or, at a minimum, to alter their authority and presence in the 
polling site. Their presence clutters the polling site, and distracts poll 
workers and election officials from the process of allowing citizens to 
vote by requiring that they comply with verification procedures that are 
based on a flawed discriminatory premise. Additionally, the means that 
private partisans have utilized to arguably prevent fraud is tainted with 
racial targeting and discrimination. 
164. 671 F. Supp.2d 575 (D.N.1. 2009). 
165. /d. at 610 ("Even if the Court were to assume that all 300 of the alleged incidents of fraud 
involved in-person misconduct at the polls, the effects of such fraud pales in comparison to the 
damage that would likely result from allowing the types of ballot security initiatives that are cur-
rently prohibited .... [Another] matter involved a voter challenge list that included 35,000 pre-
dominantly-minority individuals. If only one tenth ofthose individuals were deterred from voting by 
harassment at the polls, the effect would have been the disenfranchisement of 3,500 individuals-a 
number far greater than the 300 alleged incidents of voter fraud which the [Republican National 
Committee] points to in support of its claim."). 
166. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
167. ld. at 194. 
168. Democratic Nat'/ Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ('The effects of ballot security initia-
tives ... pose a far greater threat to the integrity of modem elections than in-person voter fraud. In 
fact, even a cursory investigation of the prevalence of voter intimidation demonstrates that ballot 
security initiatives have the potential to unfairly skew election results by disenfranchising qualified 
voters in far greater numbers of than [sic] the instances of in-person fraud that may occur during any 
given race."). 
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While the Supreme Court has found the State's interest in prevent-
ing -voter fraud to be a constitutionally acceptable goal,169 the levels of 
voter fraud -are miniscule when compared to the imposition placed on 
voters to succuinb to private inquisition. 170 When you compare the level 
of voter fraud, vote caging, and baseless voter challenges the voter is the 
victim.171 The government's interest is to provide a fair and free process 
for citizens to access the ballot. It has become clear, however, that the 
goal of some private entities is to stop as many votes as possible under 
the guise of voter fraud prevention, ballot security or voter integrity. 
IV. STATE ACTION SOLUTIONS 
"As against the unfettered right, however, lies the [cJommon sense, 
as well as constitutional law ... that government must play an active 
role in structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be a sub-
stantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if 
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes. ,,172 
In Crawford, Justice Souter recognized that voting legislation has 
"two competing interests," the fundamental right to vote and the need for 
governmental structure in elections. 173 In a democracy, political partici-
pation serves as a fundamental component of its legitimacy.174 Partisan 
voter challenges do not further these laudable principles. This allowance, 
however, is often used to "game" the system. Ballot security initiatives 
ft ~ 175 Th .. h o en use party as a proxy .Lor race. e presumptIon agamst t e voter 
169. See, e_g_, Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (stating that there is "no question" that prevention of 
voter fraud constitutes a legitimate and important state interest). 
170. See David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental-' The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of 
the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483,486 (2008) ("[V)oter fraud 
is used as a pretext for a broader agenda to disenfranchise Americans and rig elections."). 
171. In a 1986 election, the RNC used vote caging to compile a list of voters, mostly black, that 
it attempted to have removed from the voter rolls. At the time, Kris Wolfe, the Republican National 
Committee Midwest political director, wrote Lanny Griffith, the committee's Southern political 
director, "I know this is really important to you. I would guess this program would eliminate at least 
60-80,000 folks from the rolls ... If it's a close race ... which I'm assuming it is ... this could keep 
the black vote down considerably." See Martin Tolchin, The Political Campaign: Committees Pre-
pare Negative Attacks in House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1988, at BI9 (discussing similar 
tactics in a 1984 election); TERESA JAMES, CAGING DEMOCRACY: A 50 YEAR HISTORY OF 
PARTISAN CHALLENGES TO MINORITY VOTERS 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.projectvote.org/images/publicationsNoter''1020Caging/Caging_ 
Democracy_Report.pdf (discussing the vote caging activities of the 1986 Louisiana election). Fol-
lowing this caging scandal, both parties agreed to amend the original 1982 consent decree to require 
that the RNC would submit to the court any future ballot security plan for approval. 
172. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
173. !d. at210. 
174. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the candi-
date of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike 
at the heart of representative govemment."). 
175. In his expert testimony in Democratic National Committee, Professor Chandler Davidson 
opined: 
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creates a barrier to participation. 176 Accordingly, voter challenges should 
be abolished, or at a minimum, altered to a more uniform and silent 
mechanism in the polling place. 
In many instances, voter challenges are used for partisan gain, not 
election integrity or ballot security, and derive from race based caging 
schemes.177 In all these situations, the law should provide some protec-
tions to ensure that only those ineligible are burdened with the responsi-
bility of proving or disproving private allegations. In current practices, 
the presumption of eligibility has been removed from the voter and 
placed squarely in the hands of the private actor. 178 The following meas-
ures would provide a presumption of legitimacy to the voter and require 
the state to determine eligibility, not the private actors. Moreover, private 
actors would be more consistent with federal observers in their duties 
and Election Day characteristics, i.e., they would be allowed to enter and 
remain in the polls but not interject in the voting process. 179 
A. Eliminating Voter Challenges 
The voter challenge process in its present form allows private par-
ties the opportunity to disrupt the electoral process for partisan gain. 180 
Because states, in large part, determine who has access to the polls, it 
would take a major effort to legislate the voter challenger's presence out 
of the voting precinct. However, the disruption that is caused and the 
discriminatory basis for the challenges-whether race, national origin or 
[T]he reason such programs are usually carried out by Republicans rather than Democrats 
may simply be a matter of statistics: minority voters-who are far more likely to be 
added to a challenge list because of irregularities in registration attributable to language 
barriers, lack of photo identification cards ("ID"), or changes of address-have histori-
cally tended to vote for Democratic candidates. 
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 590 (D.N.J. 2009). 
176. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71-79,123 (2009) 
(arguing for expanding the use of the "Democracy Canon," which generally construes election 
statutes in the voter's favor). 
177. See JAMES, supra note 171, at 5-6. 
178. See Benson, supra note 62, at 271 (arguing for uniform election administration measures 
on basis that "the presumption that the voter is sovereign on Election Day, and that every policy and 
practice implemented on that day must consider the voter and his or her experience as paramount"). 
179. See infra Part [Y.B-C. 
180. [n Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 (2004), the State of Ohio allowed challeng-
ers to be stationed in polls. The Hamilton County Republican Party requested to have additional 
challengers beyond the typical filed list of precinct challengers present at polling places, assigned to 
predominantly African American precincts. [d. at 1301. The district court overruled the State's 
decision to allow the use of challengers on Election Day because it could create an extraordinary risk 
of intimidation and delay. Id. at 1301-02. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision and the 
Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 1302-03. Justice Stevens reviewed the case without referring the 
matter to the full Supreme Court. Id. at 1303. He noted in his brief opinion that although "the threat 
of voter intimidation is not new to our electoral system," there was simply no evidence that voter-
targeted fraud would occur if challengers were permitted in the polling place. Id. at 1302. Emphasiz-
ing his "faith" that voter-targeted deception and intimidation would not occur and that "the elected 
officials and numerous election volunteers on the ground will carry out their responsibilities in a way 
that will enable qualified voters to cast their ballots," Justice Stevens upheld the Sixth Circuit's 
decision to allow challengers in the polling place.ld. at 1302-03. 
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language ability-as a proxy for party must be recognized and dealt with 
in either litigation, via the Fourteenth Amendment, or a legislative man-
ner, via state statute. Some scholars would argue that the presence of 
voter challengers assist the electoral process as a deterrence factor. Such 
an argument, however, has little basis in fact,181 and pales in comparison 
to the mammoth accounts of disruption and chaos.1 82 
As discussed, partisans use voter challenges like illegal peremptory 
challenges. Armed with nothing more than an address, partisans make 
presumptions based on race, primarily that the voter will not vote for 
them thus they issue a challenge to frustrate the voter and the democratic 
process. Challenges make lines longer and cause substantial confusion. 
They can also intimidate voters and disrupt polling place procedures. 183 
The primary detraction for voter challenges is that the practice casts dis-
persions on a wide swath of voters. The government could not disqualify 
a voter because of returned mail, yet, private partisans are given the abil-
ity to infringe upon a fundamental right. 
While it is tempting to suggest that states eliminate the position of 
voter challengers in the polls to avoid the instances of partisan manipula-
tion at the expense of the voter's fundamental right, a more balanced 
approach is warranted. The state rationale for massive voter challenges is 
to deter voter fraud. However, the basis for this assertion rests upon race 
discrimination. 184 The partisan is not seeking to eliminate voter fraud, but 
to eliminate voters whom it believes are predisposed to vote against its 
candidate and/or its ideals. 
Granting the challenger the authority to question a voter's eligibility 
and requiring the voter to rebut the assertions of nongovernmental enti-
ties shifts the power from the voter to the partisan. This shifting is bur-
densome to the voter and requires the state to weigh the evidence and 
make a decision against the voter. The eligibility is questioned based on 
the challenge. If the voter cannot address the nature of the challenge, the 
State will, in some instances, not allow the citizen to vote or require them 
181. See supra Part III.B-C. 
182. See Summit Cnty. Democratic Cent. & Exec. Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 554 (6th 
Cir. 2004) ("The burden on the right to vote is evident. In this case, we anticipate the arrival of 
hundreds of Republican lawyers to challenge voter registrations at the polls. Behind them will be 
hundreds of Democrat lawyers to challenge these Challengers' challenges. This is a recipe for confu-
sion and chaos."). 
183. See Schultz, supra note 170, at 485 ("A second great disenfranchisement is afoot across 
the United States as, yet again, voter fraud is raised as a way to intimidate immigrants, people of 
color, the poor, and the powerless, and prevent them from voting."); see also Sherry A. Swirsky, 
Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won't Go Away, II TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 359,361-65 (2002) (arguing that voter intimidation is a common campaign tactic and provid-
ing examples of "ballot security measures" and other measures used to deceive and intimidate). 
184. See supra Part 11. 
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to vote a provisional ballot. 185 The shifting of power and the presumption 
that the voter is in fact ineligible unduly burdens the voter. 
As held in Tiryak, elections are public functions. 186 Allowing pri-
vate parties to begin a process that could lead to racial targeting and ra-
cial discrimination manipulates a state's authority to stage elections. 
When this occurs, the private partisans "are abusing the process the State 
... has provided to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls (indeed, they are 
using the process designed to protect the integrity of the political process 
to undermine it)." 187 
If the poll worker allows the voter challenge to question a voter's 
eligibility in a racially targeted manner, that worker could subject him-
self to liability for allowing racially based discrimination. 188 In Tiryak, 
the court recognized the duality of poll watchers and the potential for 
state liability. The court opined that: 
The poll-watcher performs a dual function on Election Day. On the 
one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political party, his 
job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other 
hand, because exercise of his authority promotes an honest election, 
the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of the vote. Pro-
tecting the purity of the electoral process is a state responsibility and 
the poll-watcher's statutory role in providing that protection involves 
him in a public activity, regardless of his private political motive. 189 
185. Additionally, an unfortunate consequence of the voter challenges has been the misuse of 
provisional ballots, which are mandated in the Help America Vote Act to ensure that eligible citizens 
are not turned away from the polls. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006). The administration of provisional 
ballots has been called into question for the myriad of ways that election administrators determine 
whether to issue and count the ballot. In 2004, nearly 1.9 million provisional ballots were cast and 
1.2 million were counted, which left more than half a million people disenfranchised. U.S. ELECTION 
ASSISTANCE COMM'N, FINAL REpORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY, 6-5 (2005). Moreover, 
implementing the provisional ballot requirement left poll workers confused and many ballots unac-
counted for, creating even more disparities. See PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY ET AL., SHATTERING THE 
MYTH: AN INTTIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2004 ELECTIONS, 8 (2004), 
available at http://www.8660urvote.orgitools/publications_testimony/files/0002.pdf ("There was 
widespread confusion over the proper use of provisional ballots, and widely differing regulations 
from state to state-even from one polling place to the next-as to the use and ultimate recording of 
these ballots."); see also R. Bradley Griffin, Note, Gambling with Democracy: The Help America 
Vote Act and the Failure of the States to Administer Federal Elections, 82 WASH. U. L. REv. 509, 
525-28 (2004) (arguing that HAVA provides states too much control over federal election proce-
dures); Tokaji, supra note 9, at 129--33 (assessing the 2004 election and the failure of election re-
form to remedy election administration problems). 
186. Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("Protecting the purity of the 
electoral process is a state responsibility and the poll-watcher's statutory role in providing that 
protection involves him in a public activity, regardless of his private political motive."). 
187. Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Mont. 2008) (discuss-
ing the Montana Democratic Party's pursuit of a temporary restraining order to stop the Montana 
Republican Party from challenging 6,000 registered voters who were predominately young and 
registered Democrats). 
188. See supra Part II. 
189. Tiryak, 472 F. Supp at 824. 
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In many instances, it is not the voter's ineligibility that is deter-
mined but his inability to produce supporting documents at the polling 
place that are not required. For example, a poll worker, in response to a 
voter challenge, could require a challenged voter to present valid photo 
identification. If the voter is unable to present the requested identifica-
tion, his inability to do so does not prove that a citizen was attempting to 
commit fraud, but that he came to the polling place unprepared and for 
this, his right to vote in this election has been negated. In many instances, 
challenged voters receive a provisional ballot. The provisional ballots, 
however, are not counted unless the voter returns to a central registrar's 
office within a prescribed period of time to provide additional documen-
tation to verify his identity. Without this additional step, the provisional 
ballot is not counted. In this situation, the voter challenge merely caused 
a frustrating delay at the polls and possibly the disenfranchisement of the 
voter if she does not ultimately provide the necessary documentation. 
Accordingly, the private partisan has effectively denied, with the state's 
endorsement and assistance, an eligible voter the opportunity to vote. 
B. Need for Uniform Guidelines 
The federal government does not administer elections. It can, as 
discussed infra, regulate elections through the passage of legislation. In 
fact, Congress has passed legislation to curb discriminatory practices in 
elections. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,190 the federal govern-
ment is tasked to ensure that the method of electing federal offices is not 
tainted with race, ethnic, national origin or language minority discrimina-
tion. 191 Other statutes, such as the National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA)192 and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)193 address the ac-
tual administration of elections, inter alia, providing funds for new vot-
ing machines, requiring the development of voter databases, and increas-
190. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1973). The Voting Rights Act's most prominent temporary provisions 
include Sections five and 203, which govern which jurisdictions must report all voting changes to 
the Attorney General and designates those jurisdictions required to provide election materials in 
certain minority languages. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (Section 5); id. § 1973aa-Ia (Section 203). 
191. See discussion supra Parts LA, II, liLA, IV.A (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Equal Protection Clause). 
192. In enacting NVRA, Congress sought to increase voter registration and participation. 42 
U.S.C. §§ I 973gg(b)(l)-(2) (2006). The NVRA requires states to register voters for federal elections 
through mail registration and when citizens apply for a driver's license or seek services from certain 
state agencies that receive federal funds, such as public assistance offices providing welfare and 
Medicaid, veteran's affairs offices, and libraries. Id. §§ 1973gg-2, I 973gg-5. See supra notes 73-74 
and accompanying text. 
193. In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act to provide funding to replace out-
dated voting machines and created the Election Assistance Commission to serve as a "clearing-
house" for election administration matters. Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HA VA), Pub. L. No. 
107-252,116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545). For a detailed descrip-
tion of HAVA's legislative history, see Leonard Shambon & Keith Abouchar, Trapped by Pre-
cincts? The Help America Vote Act's Provisional Ballots and the Problem of Precincts, 10 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 133, 160-65 (2006). 
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ing voter registration opportunities. Although both the NVRA and the 
HA VA are federal creations, the legislation was left almost exclusively 
to the states to implement. 194 In order to thwart the racially discrimina-
tory practice of racially targeted voter challenges, federal agencies, such 
as the Election Assistance Commission should issue a Best Practices 
guide for states and encourage the use of uniform guidelines. 195 Congress 
could pass these guidelines, however, the lack of funding and the politi-
cal response may seem too costly to implement. States should provide 
clear guidelines on the grounds for issuing challenges and limit those 
grounds to those that a challenger would have personal knowledge of-
such as voting more than once, similar to the Vermont challenge stat-
ute. 196 States should not allow challenges based on residence, age or 
other voter qualification. It is the state that is in the best position to de-
termine voter eligibility on these grounds. While state legislators provide 
the opportunity for partisans to challenge voters, it is the voter's funda-
mental right to participate in the electoral process. State laws should not 
allow challengers to jeopardize that right based on vote caging or intimi-
dation schemes built to favor partisan outcomes instead of full participa-
tion in the electoral process or on other administrative grounds, such as a 
valid registration. 
Likewise, because local election workers are primarily responsible 
for implementing federal and state election laws, it is crucial that poll 
workers receive proper and comprehensive training. 197 The federal gov-
ernment has made an effort to provide states with best practices recom-
mendations for poll worker recruitment and training. Many nonprofit or-
194. Some states, like Tennessee, perfonned well, albeit only after federal intervention. See 
United States v. Tennessee, No. 3-02-0938 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
votinglnvraltn_cd.pdf(consent decree); see also Jason Marisam, Voter Turnout: From Cost to Coop-
eration, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 190, 202-04 (2009) (criticizing the NVRA for not dramatically 
improving voter turnout). 
195. The EAC issued a Best Practices Guide for Poll Worker Training, but has not issued 
guidelines on poll watchers or voter challenges. EAC guidelines, however, are not met with the 
honor and reverence regularly afforded a federal government agency because of its lack of enforce-
ment power. See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1608 (2009) 
(criticizing the EAC's attempts to suggest Best Practices); Hasen, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the 
EAC "has so far proven ineffective and now appears in danger of becoming a new site for partisan 
stalemate over election refonn."); Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 
ELEcnON L.1. 424, 428 (2004) ("The EAC was designed to have as little regulatory power as possi-
ble .... [A]nd for the most part it cannot 'issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any 
other action' imposing a requirement on any state or unit of local government .... ") (quoting 
HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 209,116 Stat. 1666, 1678 (2002)). 
196. Karlan, supra note 9, at 19-24,25-29 (arguing that the Bush administration treated vote 
fraud as a much larger problem than political exclusion). Karlan argues that "we need legislation that 
recognizes an official obligation to make sure all citizens who are eligible to vote are placed on the 
voting rolls and that elections run smoothly and accurately." Id. at 29. Also, Karlan believes "it is 
critical [in the area of election law] to make sure the rules are clear and clearly established before the 
election begins." Id. The Bush administration also politicized the Civil Rights Division (and the 
voting rights section in particular), and Karlan believes this department needs to be remade. Jd. at 
28-29. 
197. Many states call those persons who administer elections on Election Day at the polling 
sites across the country election judges or poll workers. 
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ganizations also seek to assist county and state governments with poll 
worker training. Proper poll worker training can serve as the difference 
between a smooth election and a troubled one. It is difficult to overstate 
the importance of proper poll worker training and knowledge regarding 
how the machines operate, what items are needed to operate the ma-
chines, what question are appropriately asked, who can assist the voter, 
and how to avoid racial or ethnic discrimination during the exercise of the 
political process. 198 
C. From Poll Watchers to Silent Observers 
On Election Day, certain jurisdictions are required either under the 
Voting Rights Act or a court order to allow federal observers inside the 
polling place to observe and document the election process. 199 The Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965 instituted the advent of the federal observer, 
whose primary responsibility is to monitor the electoral process. 200 Fed-
eral observers are prohibited from interfering in the voting process or 
198. See United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 0073541 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2004) , 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/hamtramck_ cd04.pdf (second amended consent order and 
decree requiring that the City appoint bilingual translators to protect against voter discrimination 
targeting Arab-Americans); United States v. Berks Cnty., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575, 583 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (preventing race-based voter discrimination by ordering that, inter alia, all election-related 
materials to be printed in English and Spanish). 
199. Various provisions in the Voting Rights Act authorize the Attorney General or a court to 
order or appoint federal observers. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006). For example, subsection (a) provides: 
Whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person institutes a proceeding under any 
statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any 
State or political subdivision the court shall authorize the appointment of Federal observ-
ers by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management in accordance with section 
1973d of this title to serve for such period of time for such political subdivisions as the 
court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or 
fifteenth amendment .... 
!d. The Attorney General may also assign Federal observers to a jurisdiction certified under 42 
U.S.C. §1973f. The Attorney General has certified approximately 148 jurisdictions in Alabama, 
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Texas. 
About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/examine/activ_exam.php (last updated Sept. 7,2010). 
When determining where to send federal observers, the Attorney General assesses the following 
information: 
Any incidents of discrimination or interference with the right to vote in connection 
with upcoming or recent elections; 
Any complaints to local or state officials about the incidents and what, if anything, 
was done in response; 
Names and contact information for victims of discrimination or other violations of 
federal voting rights law; 
Names and contact information for any persons who have first-hand knowledge of 
the incidents; 
Names and contact information, if possible, for persons alleged to have engaged in 
discrimination or other violations offederal voting rights law; 
Locations where incidents have occurred. 
See id. Thirteen jurisdictions in nine states have been ordered to allow federal observers to monitor 
elections. /d. 
200. See § I 973f1:d)(1 )-(2) (charging Federal observers with the duties of attending places 
where elections are being held or votes are being tabulated to "observe[J whether persons entitled to 
vote are being permitted to vote," and "whether votes cast votes cast by persons entitled to vote are 
being properly tabulated"). 
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attempting to correct what may seem to constitute voting irregularities or 
illegalities. A federal observer documents what she observes from the 
beginning of the Election Day to the counting of the ballots.20t Federal 
observers are merely eye witnesses, and are not allowed to interfere with 
the voting process. Unlike voter challenges they do not interfere with the 
voting process. They do not speak to nor direct poll workers or voters. At 
the end of the Election Day, federal observers draft a report that can be 
used, if need be, in any litigation if it is found that systematic discrimina-
tion in the operation of the polling place occurred. Likewise, voter chal-
lengers could serve as eyewitnesses and document what they observe 
throughout the Election Day experience. Federal observers help thwart 
potential voter intimidation. Their presence promotes the exercise of 
voter integrity and the elimination of voter fraud. 
Instead of the voter losing her ability to vote or having that right 
called into question, if the voter challenger has credible documentation 
of voting irregularities, especially voter fraud, the voter challenger's 
Election Day report can serve as evidence in the litigation proceeding. 
Instead of forcing the voter to possibly lose her right to vote, the voter 
challenger preserves the right to challenge the election in future litiga-
tion. In this way, the presumption of eligibility is restored to the voter. 
More so, the burden to prove voter fraud or other irregularity is squarely 
placed on the partisan but does not disrupt the voting process nor strip 
the citizen's right to vote.202 
This Article is not advocating that state governments treat voter 
challengers as government federal observers. Voter challenger statutes 
should include a crucial and vital characteristic that federal observers 
have, which is that they are neutral and impartia1.203 Just as the history of 
partisan involvement has caused the scaling back of partisan involvement 
in the election process, so here, an adjustment is needed to ensure the 
impartiality of the electoral system. When private partisan concerns are 
paramount to individual voters the process is skewed towards the parti-
san and questions the integrity of the system. 
20 I. See James Thomas Tucker, The Power of Observation: The Role of Federal Observers 
Under The Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 227, 248 (2007) ("Federal observers are able 
to monitor [and document] every aspect of an election, from the time the voter enters the polling 
place to the moment that he or she casts her ballot, and even thereafter when the ballots are tabu-
lated."). 
202. See Steve Barber et aI., Comment, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and 
the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 483-84 (1988), for a discussion of the 
burdens on mistakenly purged voters. The authors assert that the voter purge laws place the burden 
of reregistering on the purged voters, which may "thwart political participation and place a dispro-
portionate burden on minority voters." Id. at 483. The history of mechanisms such as voter purge 
laws have created the disillusionment of minority voters and has resulted in low political participa-
tion from such groups. Id. at 483-84. 
203. Federal observers are Office of Personnel Management employees. They are nonpartisan 
and merely observe the election process without comment or interruption. Tucker, supra note 208, at 
230,241,254. 
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CONCLUSION 
While our democratic form of government thrives on political par-
ticipation, the level of authority that government has given to private 
partisan organizations through the use of voter challenges may well 
threaten the heart and integrity of the democratic process. If private indi-
viduals are allowed to determine who is allowed to vote and in what 
manner, the damage to the integrity of the electoral process is deeply 
wounded, particularly when those challenges are based solely on geo-
graphical designation, physical hue or language ability. In actuality, these 
measures determined the eligibility of the voter and in many cases, pre-
vent them from casting a ballot. A strong public-private alliance allows 
organizations, groups and individuals to express their collective political 
opinion. It is the ability, however, to silence those voices through the 
lack of confidence204 in the system and particularly allowing partisans to 
determine voter eligibility that harms the system. 
The State, which is given the authority to prescribe the requirements 
for voting, has surrendered that authority to private and often partisan 
individuals. More poll watchers, more litigation or stringent statutes are 
not the only answer to this perplexing problem. The solution lies in our 
willingness to prescribe measures that presume the validity and eligibil-
ity of voters and scale back the Jim Crow era disenfranchising methods 
that are becoming prevalent in this new millennium. 
204. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 611 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
